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From Mayberry to Ferguson: The 
Militarization of American Policing 
Equipment, Culture, and Mission 
Cadman Robb Kiker III* 
Abstract 
We are at the dawn of a new era of policing in the United 
States. In recent months, images of armed police officers 
patrolling the streets of Ferguson, Missouri, and of a toddler 
burned by a Georgia SWAT team’s grenade have been indelibly 
branded into America’s social consciousness. There is a unique 
bipartisan outcry from Washington in a time otherwise marked by 
bitter political divides. Politicians and journalists alike are 
questioning the efficacy of a militaristic police force and the path 
that led to this shift in the paradigm of policing.  
This Essay examines the how and why of police militarization 
in the United States; it details some of the most egregious 
instances of police overreach, mission creep, and proliferation of 
military-style police units treating citizens as an enemy 
population. It seems all is quiet in Congress after a few seemingly 
futile hearings on militarization. The Executive Branch has 
released suggestions that are expected to manifest in an executive 
order any day. Unfortunately, all of these solutions are too little, 
too late. The streets of America are much more akin to a war zone 
than the democratic nation that our Founders envisioned, and it is 
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“The means of defence against foreign danger, have been 
always the instruments of tyranny at home.”—James Madison1 
I. Introduction 
Over the last several decades, there has been a paradigm 
shift within police departments across the United States.2 Public 
                                                                                                     
 1. James Madison, Speech from the Constitutional Convention June 29, 
1787, in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 465 (Max 
Farrand, ed. 1911). 
 2. See WAR COMES HOME: THE EXCESSIVE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICAN 
POLICING, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (2014), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/jus14-warcomeshome-report-web-
rel1.pdf [hereinafter ACLU Report] (detailing the use of paramilitary police 
units, the sources of the equipment used by such units, the effect that 
militarization has on policing generally, and the disparate effect of modern 
policing units on various communities—most notably minority communities); 
Nathan Canestaro, Homeland Defense: Another Nail in the Coffin for Posse 
Comitatus, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99 (2003) (discussing the details of the 
decay of the protections afforded by the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1385 (2012), upon the advent of the global war on terrorism); Diane Cecilia 
Weber, Warrior Cops: The Ominous Growth of Paramiltiarism in American 
Police Departments (Cato Inst., Briefing Papers No. 50, 1999), 
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/bp50.pdf (providing a history of 
the rise of paramilitarism in the United States up to 1999, beginning in the 
1960s); Hank Johnson & Michael Shank, Why Do Police Departments Need 
Military Vehicles and Weapons?, USA TODAY (Mar. 10, 2014, 5:07 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/03/10/america-police-military-
weapons-column/5789445/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (detailing the acquisition 
of military vehicles and weapons by multiple American towns and some of the 
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concern about the militarized form of local policing has become 
much more vocal following an unfortunate incident in August 
2014, in which a Caucasian police officer shot and killed an 
unarmed African-American teen in Ferguson, Missouri.3 The 
public’s response was initially concerned with racial issues, 
prompting protests and some instances of looting and violence. 
Local law enforcement responded by sending in police that were 
virtually indistinguishable from soldiers, equipped with military 
weapons, equipment, body armor, and armored vehicles to 
disperse the demonstrators.4 These events prompted many to ask 
how the shift to a militarized police force could go largely 
unnoticed until now. More importantly, now that the militarized 
police force is a reality, what can we do about it? Does it violate 
our Constitution or our federal laws?  
This Essay presents answers to both of these questions. 
First, this Essay presents a short explanation of the sources of 
this militarization. Next, it explores the relevant legal 
prohibitions on military policing and our longstanding policy 
against military involvement in civilian legal affairs. It continues 
by examining the government’s response to the public outcry in 
Ferguson. Finally, this Essay will assess potential responses to 
the militarization of the police force, concluding what can and 
should be done to address this policy concern. It is important to 
note that this Essay does not advocate on behalf of a specific 
political ideology or agenda, but rather attempts to lay bare an 
                                                                                                     
programs that law enforcement agencies use to acquire them) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 3. See Eliott C. McLaughlin, What We Know About Michael Brown’s 
Shooting, CNN (Aug. 15, 2014, 12:10 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/11/us/missouri-ferguson-michael-brown-what-we-
know/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 4. See Paul Szoldra, This Is the Terrifying Result of the Militarization of 
Police, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 12, 2014, 4:05 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/police-militarization-ferguson-2014-8 (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2015) (quoting a soldier from the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne 
Division who referred to the Ferguson, Missouri police response to protestors by 
stating that “[w]e rolled lighter than that in an actual warzone”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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important issue, analyze the contextual underpinnings, and 
present a prudent path forward.  
 
II. The Militarization of Police: Sources and Mission Creep 
The concept of the “warrior cop”5 we see patrolling the streets 
of America today has been created as a response to the various 
“wars” propagated by numerous politicians. There have been 
“wars” on crime, drugs, and, since the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001, terrorism.6 The slide towards militarization 
began in the 1960s with the war on crime, during which police 
departments around the country created paramilitary-style police 
units. Former Los Angeles Police Chief Daryl Gates envisioned 
the first of these tactical units as a response to the futility of 
traditional police tactics—such as having officers present as a 
deterrent—during the 1966 Watts riots.7 Gates created the first 
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)8 team to react to high-risk 
situations, employing military-style guerrilla warfare and 
counter-sniper tactics he sourced from a nearby U.S. Marine 
                                                                                                     
 5. This term has been attributed to Radley Balko. See generally RADLEY 
BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP (2013). 
 6. See Karl Bickel, Will the Growing Militarization of Our Police Doom 
Community Policing?, COMMUNITY POLICING DISPATCH, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Dec. 
2013), http://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/12-2013/will_the_growing_militarizati
on_of_our_police_doom_community_policing.asp (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) 
(stating that a combination of academies modeled after military boot camp, 
military style uniforms, an “us versus them” mentality, and the war on crime, 
war on drugs, and war on terrorism threaten community policing) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 7. Karan R. Singh, Treading the Thin Blue Line: Military Special-
Operations Trained Police SWAT Teams and the Constitution, 9 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 673, 675 (2001) (citing DARYL GATES, CHIEF: MY LIFE IN THE L.A.P.D. 
110 (1992); ROBERT L. SNOW, SWAT TEAMS 6–7 (1996)).  
 8. The term “SWAT” will be used henceforth to refer to all special units or 
tactical teams within a law enforcement agency that are used for high-risk or 
critical situations. These teams are referred to by a number of acronyms such as 
HRT (Hostage Response Team), SERT (Special Emergency Response Team), 
SRT (Special Reaction Team), SOG (Special Operations Group), and ESU 
(Emergency Services Unit). Many of these acronyms are department specific. 
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Corps unit.9 Gates deployed his SWAT team for the first time 
against the Los Angeles headquarters of the Black Panthers.10 
The botched raid resulted in the use of over five thousand rounds 
of ammunition and Gates asking Los Angeles Mayor Sam Yorty 
to request permission from the Department of Defense (DOD) to 
fire a grenade into the headquarters.11 Radley Balko notes that, 
in retrospect, it was not the use of a grenade launcher that was 
remarkable, but “the procedures, the caution, and the trepidation 
that went into procuring the grenade launcher. About twenty 
years later, the Pentagon would begin giving away . . . plenty of 
grenade launchers.”12 Today, at least two university police 
departments have procured grenade launchers from the federal 
government.13 The grenade launchers have never been used and 
the campus police departments only have access to gas canister 
ammunition.14 The troubling issue, however, is the lack of 
oversight and discretion on behalf of the federal government that 
allowed a campus police department to obtain a weapon of war.  
The number of specialty police units—and the frequency of 
their use—expanded in the 1980s to meet the needs of the war on 
drugs.15 Today, seventy-nine percent of SWAT team deployments 
                                                                                                     
 9. See Singh, supra note 7, at 676 (citing DARYL GATES, CHIEF: MY LIFE IN 
THE L.A.P.D. 109 (1992)). 
 10. See id. at 678. 
 11. John Payne, How Police Became a Standing Army, AM. CONSERVATIVE 
(Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/how-police-
became-a-standing-army/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (reviewing Radley Balko’s 
book, Rise of the Warrior Cop) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 12. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting BALKO, supra note 5, at 
79–80). 
 13. Tyler Kingkade & Alexandra Svokos, Campus Police Are Stocking up on 
Military-Grade Weapons, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 15, 2014, 5:47 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/15/campus-police-
weapons_n_5823310.html (last updated Sept. 16, 2014, 4:59 PM) (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2015) (explaining what kinds of weapons are in the possession of 
universities and colleges and noting that sixty-three college campuses have 
acquired M-16s, twenty-seven have received M-14s, and six have procured mine-
resistant vehicles from the Department of Defense) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 14. Id. 
 15. See Peter B. Kraska & Victor E. Kappeler, Militarizing American 
Police: The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units, 44 SOC. PROBS. 1, 7 
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are for the execution of a warrant, most commonly in drug 
investigations.16 The expense of the weapons and gear used by 
such units made them cost prohibitive in small communities until 
the advent of the federal 1033 Program.17 This program, operated 
by the DOD, allows for surplus military weaponry and gear to be 
transferred to local law enforcement agencies.18 Although the 
equipment supplied by the 1033 Program is free, many small law 
enforcement agencies could not justify the related maintenance 
expenses to their respective tax bases at the time the program 
was introduced.  
This changed after 9/11. Suddenly, the federal government 
tasked every law enforcement agency in the United States—no 
matter the size—with being a part of the “global war on 
terrorism.”19 This new federal mandate also resulted in a massive 
reorganization of several federal agencies, many of them falling 
under the control of the newly formed Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS).20 The DHS has become a powerhouse agency 
with a 2013 expenditure of over sixty billion dollars.21 Some of 
                                                                                                     
(1997) (explaining that paramilitary police units (PPUs) expanded to being used 
for “high risk warrant work,” which is almost entirely drug raids). 
 16. ACLU Report, supra note 2, at 5 (“SWAT teams were often deployed—
unnecessarily and aggressively—to execute search warrants in low-level drug 
investigations; deployments for hostage or barricade scenarios occurred in only a 
small number of incidents.”).  
 17. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. 104-
201, 110 Stat. 2422 (1996). This Act was an update to the 1208 Program, which 
was included in the 1991 National Defense Authorization Act. See National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. 101-510, 104 Stat. 1485 
(1990). 
 18. See About the 1033 Program, L. ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT OFFICE, DEF. 
LOGISTICS AGENCY, http://www.dispositionservices.dla.mil/leso/Pages/default.asp
x (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) (describing how the 1033 Program operates) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 19. See The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days, U.S. DEP’T 
STATE, http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/6947.htm (last updated Jan. 20, 
2009) (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) (discussing the U.S. reaction to 9/11 and 
associated changes in law enforcement) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 20. See Creation of the Department of Homeland Security, DEP’T HOMELAND 
SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security (last updated 
Oct. 21, 2014) (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 21. BUDGET-IN-BRIEF FISCAL YEAR 2014, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., 
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this immense budget is available to local law enforcement 
agencies in the form of grants that can be used to acquire 
military equipment from the federal government.22 As of 2007, 
approximately eighty percent of U.S. towns with a population 
between twenty-five thousand and fifty thousand people 
maintained a SWAT team.23 More current numbers of nationwide 
SWAT deployments are generally unavailable due to a lack of 
oversight. However, a Maryland law requiring police departments 
to track SWAT deployments released a report showing that 
Maryland alone deployed a SWAT team an average of four-and-
one-half times per day in 2014 and that over ninety-three percent 
of those deployments were for the execution of a search warrant.24 
Nearly sixty percent of those deployments were for nonviolent 
crimes.25  
As an additional incentive for repeated deployment, SWAT 
team use can be self-funding. As Peter B. Kraska and Victor E. 
Kappeler found in a 1996 survey, the execution of warrants on 
private residences has become a proactive policing tool in which 
officers are often just as concerned with seizing money and 
weapons as they are drugs for the purpose of funding new 
military-style equipment.26 When performing these drug raids, 
                                                                                                     
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/MGMT/FY%202014%20BIB%
20-%20FINAL%20-508%20Formatted%20%284%29.pdf. 
 22. See Find and Apply for Grants, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., 
http://www.dhs.gov/how-do-i/find-and-apply-grants (last updated Oct. 29, 2012) 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (describing how law enforcement may apply for such 
equipment) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Funding for 
Equipment, NAT’L INST. JUST., http://www.nij.gov/funding/Pages/equipment-
funding.aspx (last updated Sept. 7, 2013) (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) (listing new 
and surplus equipment funding programs for law enforcement, including the 
1033, 1122, and DHS programs) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 23. Peter B. Kraska, Militarization and Policing—Its Relevance to 21st 
Century Police, 1 POLICING 501, 507 (2007), 
http://cjmasters.eku.edu/sites/cjmasters.eku.edu/files/21stmilitarization.pdf. 
 24. See MD. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CTR., GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF CRIME 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, FIFTH REPORT TO THE STATE OF MARYLAND UNDER 
PUBLIC SAFETY ARTICLE § 3-507, FISCAL YEAR 2014 SWAT TEAM DEPLOYMENT 
DATA ANALYSIS 3, 6 (2014), 
http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/msac/documents/SWATReportFY2014.pdf. 
 25. Id. at 6. 
 26. See Kraska & Kappeler, supra note 15, at 9 (noting that money and 
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officers often request “no-knock” warrants, claiming that law 
enforcement interests merit the lightning-fast display of 
overwhelming force.27 However, even if the officers are unable to 
obtain a no-knock warrant, the consequences of proceeding with a 
no-knock raid anyway are nearly non-existent since the Supreme 
Court ruled in 2006 that such a raid does not trigger the 
exclusionary rule.28 The aforementioned ACLU report indicates 
that, of the law enforcement agencies that it surveyed, SWAT 
teams were deployed for active-shooter or hostage situations only 
seven percent of the time.29  
The use of SWAT has become so prolific that it seems at 
times to border on the absurd. The Eleventh Circuit recently 
ruled in Berry v. Leslie30 that police officers using SWAT tactics to 
perform a regulatory raid on Orlando, Florida barbershops 
violated the Fourth Amendment.31 In 2009, the Fifth Circuit 
allowed a civil rights claim to continue against Louisiana police 
for a SWAT raid of a nightclub that the officials couched as a 
regulatory inspection.32 In St. Louis County, Missouri—home to 
Ferguson—police have announced that it is their standard 
procedure to use a SWAT team to serve any felony warrant.33 
                                                                                                     
asset seizure through “warrantwork” has become a “proactive policing tactic, 
perhaps more prevalent than undercover work, of PPUs conducting military-
style investigatory drug raids on private residences”).  
 27. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929–37 (1995) (finding that the 
common law knock-and-announce rule is part of the reasonableness analysis of 
the Fourth Amendment and various factors may justify an unannounced entry). 
 28. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596–99 (2006) (noting that 
increasing professionalism of police forces and civil rights suits were enough of a 
police deterrent to knock-and-announce violations and finding that the 
exclusionary rule was not warranted in knock-and-announce violations). The 
exclusionary rule originated in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and 
was applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643 (1961). The Court rejected its “indiscriminate application” in United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984). 
 29. See ACLU Report, supra note 2, at 5.  
 30. 767 F.3d 1144 (11th Cir.), order vacated pending rehearing en banc, 
Berry v. Orange County, 771 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 31. See id. at 1154. 
 32. Club Retro v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 195 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that 
defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity for their entry and search of 
Club Retro).  
 33. George Sells, Warrant Served by SWAT Team Causes Scare in South 
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Finally, in perhaps the most egregious example of SWAT mission 
creep in recent memory, an Arkansas police chief announced a 
policy in 2012 that called for SWAT officers to patrol the streets 
of an exceptionally small town, stopping every pedestrian who 
crossed their path and demanding identification and a reason for 
being out walking.34 According to the chief, those who were 
unable or refused to produce identification would likely be 
charged with obstructing a government operation.35 All of these 
situations violate the intended role of police in society. As John 
Paul and Michael Birzer note in their essay on the social 
relations between police and the public, “[t]he job of the police is 
to react to the violence of others, to apprehend criminal suspects 
and deliver them over to a court of law[,]” not to “initiate[] 
violence on command [without concern for] the Bill of Rights.”36 It 
is abundantly clear that this mindset does not pervade modern 
policing in the United States.37  
Some of these raids have had tragic consequences. In Detroit, 
a seven-year-old girl was shot in the head and killed after a 
SWAT team entered her home.38 The suspect that the team 
                                                                                                     
County, FOX2NOW ST. LOUIS (Aug. 13, 2013, 9:36 PM), 
http://fox2now.com/2013/08/13/warrant-served-causes-scare-in-south-county-
neighborhood/ (last updated Aug. 14, 2013, 9:31 AM) (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 34. Radley Balko, The Police State Comes to Arkansas, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Dec. 18, 2012, 8:50 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/radley-balko/the-police-
state-comes-to_b_2321878.html (last updated Feb. 17, 2013, 5:12 AM) (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 35. See id. 
 36. John Paul & Michael L. Birzer, Images of Power: An Analysis of the 
Militarization of Police Uniforms and Messages of Service, 32 FREE INQUIRY IN 
CREATIVE SOC. 121, 124 (2004) (quoting Weber, supra note 2, at 10).  
 37. See, e.g., Sunil Dutta, I’m a Cop. If You Don’t Want to Get Hurt, Don’t 
Challenge Me, WASH POST (Aug. 19, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/08/19/im-a-cop-if-you-
dont-want-to-get-hurt-dont-challenge-me/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (“[I]f you 
don’t want to get shot, tased, pepper-sprayed, struck with a baton or thrown to 
the ground, just do what I tell you.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 38. Kate Abbey-Lambertz, How a Police Officer Shot a Sleeping 7-Year-Old 
to Death, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 17, 2014, 5:39 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/17/aiyana-stanley-jones-joseph-weekley-
trial_n_5824684.html (last updated Oct. 2, 2014, 2:59 PM) (last visited Feb. 16, 
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sought lived in the other unit of the girl’s family’s duplex, and a 
man detained on the street before the raid warned the officers 
that there were children in the home.39 In Cornelia, Georgia, a 
SWAT team executed a no-knock warrant on a suspected drug 
dealer and, before entering the home, threw a “flash bang” 
grenade that landed in the crib of a small child, severely burning 
the child’s face.40 Since the incident, a grand jury has cleared the 
raiding officers of any wrongdoing and the county has rescinded 
an initial offer to pay for the child’s medical expenses.41 But it is 
not always the residents of a raided home that are the victims of 
these aggressive tactics. Although police departments often cite 
“officer safety” to justify the tactics used in these raids, the SWAT 
officers themselves have been the victims of violence when an 
unsuspecting homeowner mistook a no-knock raid for a home 
invasion and opened fire in perceived self-defense.42 In one case 
in Texas, a grand jury refused to indict a man who killed a police 
officer under the belief that the officer was a criminal breaking 
into his home.43  
III. Existing Limitations: A Policy Against Military Involvement 
in Civilian Affairs 
Since 1776, the United States government has erected 
barriers against military involvement in civilian affairs. Courts 
                                                                                                     
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Eliott C. McLaughlin, No Indictments for Georgia SWAT Team That 
Burned Baby with Stun Grenade, CNN (Oct. 7, 2014, 5:50 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/07/us/georgia-toddler-stun-grenade-no-indictment/ 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 41. Id. 
 42. See Botched Paramilitary Police Raids, CATO INST., 
http://www.cato.org/raidmap (last visited Jan. 2, 2015) (mapping and listing 
various examples of botched paramilitary police raids) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 43. Clay Falls & Michael Order, Man Charged with Killing Burleson 
County Deputy No Billed by Grand Jury, KBTX.COM (Feb. 7, 2014, 8:50 PM), 
http://www.kbtx.com/home/headlines/Man-Charged-With-Killing-Burleson-
County-Deputy-No-Billed-by-Grand-Jury-243993261.html (last visited Feb. 16, 
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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have long noted these restrictions, viewed as utterly essential to 
basic liberty,44 and exemplified by such laws as the Third 
Amendment to the Constitution,45 the Insurrection Act,46 and the 
Posse Comitatus Act (PCA).47 The quartering of British troops in 
colonial Boston in the late eighteenth century served as a partial 
catalyst to the Revolutionary War.48 These troops were placed 
among the dissident population of Boston as a show of power in 
an attempt to coerce an increasingly volatile populace into 
submission.49 The Founders took issue with military law 
enforcement for several reasons, but none was more infuriating to 
those under martial law than their inability to dispense justice 
                                                                                                     
 44. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1972) (“[A] traditional and 
strong resistance of Americans to any military intrusions into civilian 
affairs . . . found early expression, for example, in the Third Amendment’s 
explicit prohibition against quartering soldiers in private homes without 
consent and in the constitutional provisions for civilian control of the military.”); 
United States v. Dreyer, 767 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that a NCIS 
sweep of civilian computers throughout Washington state for child pornography 
violated the Posse Comitatus Act and that the evidence should be excluded 
because of “‘a traditional and strong resistance of Americans to any military 
intrusion into civilian affairs’” (quoting Laird, 408 U.S. at 15)). The PCA was 
originally enacted on the understandings that “[t]he great beauty of our system 
of government is that it is to be governed by the people,” and that if we use the 
“military power . . . to discharge those duties that belong to civil officers and to 
the citizens,” we “have given up the character of [our] Government; it is no 
longer a government for liberty; it is no longer a government founded in the 
consent of the people; it has become a government of force.” 7 CONG. REC. 4247 
(1878) (statement of Sen. Benjamin Hill). See generally CHARLES DOYLE & 
JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT AND 
RELATED MATTERS: THE USE OF THE MILITARY TO EXECUTE CIVILIAN LAW (2012), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42659.pdf.  
 45. U.S. CONST. amend. III (“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered 
in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a 
manner to be prescribed by law.”). See generally Tom W. Bell, The Third 
Amendment: Forgotten but Not Gone, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 117 (1993) 
(detailing the origins and use of the Third Amendment). 
 46. 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–35 (2012). 
 47. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2012). 
 48. See DOYLE & ELSEA, supra note 44, at n.12 (“The soldiers, one ought 
always to remember, went into Boston not as an occupying army but rather as a 
force of uniformed peace-keepers, or policemen. Their role as even the radicals 
conceived it was to assist the executive and if necessary the courts to maintain 
order.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 49. See id.  
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when a soldier committed a crime.50 The militarized police forces 
in the United States today mirror the British military that 
occupied Boston most vividly in this light.  
It is difficult to hold an officer personally liable for a crime or 
civil rights violation committed while exercising official police 
business. In the civil context, qualified immunity has become an 
almost insurmountable tool to prevent the personal liability of 
law enforcement officers.51 As for criminal liability, a local law 
enforcement officer is nearly insusceptible to grand jury 
indictment.52  
A cursory legal analysis of the aforementioned Insurrection 
Act, PCA, and Third Amendment53 demonstrates that there is 
nothing strictly illegal about a militarized local police force.54 For 
                                                                                                     
 50. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para 2 (U.S. 1776) (“He [King 
George] has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the 
Civil power . . . . [He has assented to] protecting them [the soldiers], by a mock 
Trial, from punishment for any Murders which they should commit on the 
Inhabitants of these States.”). 
 51. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (“Qualified immunity 
balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable 
when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from 
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties 
reasonably.”); Philip M. Stinson, Steven L. Brewer Jr., Theresa M. Lanese & 
Mallorie A. Wilson, Federal Civil Rights Litigation Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 
as a Correlate of Police Misconduct, AM. SOC’Y OF CRIMINOLOGY (Nov. 2014), 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&context=philip_stins
on (discussing a study of how civil litigation against police officers relates to 
officer misconduct). 
 52. See Philip M. Stinson, Evin J. Carmack, Jacob M. Frankhouser & 
Mallorie A. Wilson, Police Crime Arrests in the United States, 2011, AM. SOC’Y OF 
CRIMINOLOGY (Nov. 2014), http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1039&context=philip_stinson (noting that during a seven-year period, ending in 
2011, forty-one police officers were charged with either murder or manslaughter 
out of 2,600 justifiable homicides that were reported to the F.B.I. in the same 
period) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); James C. McKinley 
Jr. & Al Baker, Grand Jury System, With Exceptions, Favors the Police in 
Fatalities, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/08/nyregi
on/grand-juries-seldom-charge-police-officers-in-fatal-actions.html?_r=0 (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2015) (noting how “the justice system can favor the police, often 
shielding them from murder or serious manslaughter charges”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 53. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text. 
 54. See generally DOYLE & ELSEA, supra note 44 (discussing the legal 
underpinnings and application of the PCA); Canestaro, supra note 2, at 100 
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example, for the purposes of Posse Comitatus, the militarized 
local police forces are not “part of the Army or Air Force” under 
the direct command of the Department of Defense.55 Further, the 
PCA was substantially weakened in 1981 to allow the military to 
more completely participate in the war on drugs.56  
Be this as it may, the strict legality of an action taken in 
reliance on the status quo does not lend credence to the 
proposition that it is the moral, ethical, or prudent path for our 
society, as we have so painfully learned in the past.57 Therefore, 
now is the time for action; be it legislation, litigation, or a shift in 
policy, an effective solution to this threat to liberty must be 
found. A glimmer of hope in the litigation context has recently 
surfaced in a judicial strengthening of the long-neglected PCA. In 
United States v. Dreyer,58 the Ninth Circuit held that—beyond 
the criminal sanctions included in the statute, which have never 
been successfully invoked—a PCA violation can lead to the 
exclusion of evidence.59 
                                                                                                     
(noting that “increased public confidence in the military and judicial deference 
to military actions have undermined the principles upon which the PCA was 
founded” and there is a resulting increase in the DOD’s legal freedom to 
intervene domestically). 
 55. See, e.g., DOYLE & ELSEA, supra note 44, at 54 (discussing the legal test 
to determine whether military activity in support of civilian authorities violated 
the PCA); Canestaro, supra note 2, at 123 (discussing the phrase “any part of 
the Army” within the PCA). 
 56. See DOYLE & ELSEA, supra note 44, at 41–46 (noting the expansions 
made to the PCA during the 1981 amendments); Canestaro, supra note 2, at 
114–16 (discussing the 1981 amendments to the PCA). 
 57. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, (outlining the three-fifths compromise); 
id. art. I, § 9, (discussing the “importation of such persons”); id. art. IV § 2 (“No 
person held to Service or Labor in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping 
into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be 
discharged from such Service or Labor . . . .”); Indian Removal Act, 4 Stat. 411, 
§ 1 (1830) (providing for an exchange of land with the Indians and their 
removal); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (concluding that the doctrine 
of “separate but equal” was constitutional), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of 
Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (finding that segregation of children in public 
schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 58. 767 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 59. See id. at 835–36 (noting that there is a need to exercise the 
exclusionary rule because “there is evidence of widespread and repeated 
violations” (internal citations omitted)). 
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IV. The Federal Response to Militarization: Too Little Too Late 
Shortly after the public display of power in Ferguson, the 
U.S. Senate began reacting to public outcry over the efficacy of 
militarized police forces. As part of this bipartisan reaction, 
Senators “criticized federal programs that outfit police 
departments with military gear, saying they waste funds and sow 
mistrust between law enforcement and the communities they 
police.”60 While initially promising, as of the time of this writing, 
any congressional action on this issue seems unlikely. 
In 2014, President Barack Obama ordered a review of the 
acquisition programs that funnel military-grade equipment to 
local law enforcement agencies.61 The Executive Office of the 
President released its conclusions in a memorandum that 
detailed the sources of the questionable equipment being used on 
American streets and posited suggestions for curtailing law 
enforcement militarization in December 2014.62 In January 2015, 
President Obama signed an executive order creating “law 
enforcement working group” co-chaired by the Secretaries of 
Defense and Homeland Security and the Attorney General.63 The 
executive order requires the working group to: (1) “identify 
agency actions that can improve Federal support for the 
acquisition of controlled equipment” by local law enforcement 
                                                                                                     
 60. Andrew Grossman, Senators Criticized Growing Militarization of Local 
Police Departments, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2014, 7:38 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/senators-criticize-militarization-of-local-police-
departments-1410287125 (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 61. Mark Landler, Obama Offers New Standards on Police Gear in Wake of 
Ferguson Protests, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/us/politics/obama-to-toughen-standards-on-
police-use-of-military-gear.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Alicia Parlapiano, The Flow of Money and 
Equipment to Local Police, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/23/us/flow-of-money-and-
equipment-to-local-police.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 62. See EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, REVIEW: FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR LOCAL 
LAW ENFORCEMENT EQUIPMENT ACQUISITION (Dec. 2014), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/federal_support_for_local_law
_enforcement_equipment_acquisition.pdf. 
 63. Exec. Order No. 13,688, 80 Fed. Reg. 3451, 3451–3453 (Jan. 22, 2015). 
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agencies (LEAs); and (2) “provide [a report containing] specific 
recommendations [and an implementation plan] to the President 
regarding actions that can be taken to improve the provision of 
Federal support for the acquisition of controlled equipment by 
LEAs.”64 
It is doubtful that the working group created by President 
Obama will recommend complete demilitarization of the police or 
shift the culture of militarization. In fact, these proposals may 
exacerbate the situation. For example, the committee suggests 
that it is “possible that an increase in technology sharing, cross-
training and increased operational relationships between LEAs 
and the military can foster an environment at the local level in 
which it is difficult to distinguish between the appropriate 
military use and the appropriate LEA use of the same 
equipment.”65 It seems that the executive response to the 
perceived over-militarization of American police will include 
actual military training and closer relations between law 
enforcement and military organizations, which will likely 
intensify the military mindset adopted by police forces.  
Additionally, the President’s memorandum contains a 
suggestion that law enforcement agencies should “have policies in 
place that address appropriate use and employment of controlled 
equipment, as well as protection of civil rights and civil 
liberties.”66 While facially a bold and admirable endeavor, this too 
falls short of what is needed. As evidenced by the July 2014 death 
of Eric Garner at the hands of the New York Police Department, 
the existence of a department policy does little to assure law 
enforcement accountability. After all, the officer responsible for 
Mr. Garner’s death violated a longstanding policy of his 
department and was not indicted.67 Another suggestion contained 
                                                                                                     
 64. Id. 
 65. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 62, at 4.  
 66. Id. at 6. 
 67. See Ray Sanchez & Shimon Prokupecz, Protests After N.Y. Cop Not 
Indicted in Chokehold Death; Feds Reviewing Case, CNN (Dec. 4, 2014, 6:09 
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/03/justice/new-york-grand-jury-chokehold/ 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (describing Garner’s death, the police officer’s 
violation of department policy, and the lack of indictment for that violation and 
Garner’s death) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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in the memorandum would “[r]equire after-action analysis 
reports for significant incidents involving federally-provided or 
federally-funded equipment.”68 While this recommendation 
appears to have value, one can only speculate as to what 
constitutes “significant incidents.” As explained in detail above, 
SWAT deployment has become a daily occurrence in the United 
States, with St. Louis County, Missouri, maintaining a policy 
that all felony warrants must be served by a SWAT team.69 Thus, 
it is very unlikely that such routine practice would qualify as 
“significant.” Further, the aforementioned self-funding nature of 
these tactical teams would suggest that many of them are no 
longer in need of federal funding or equipment, and will therefore 
be able to functionally ignore any suggestions made by the 
President’s working group.70 
This ability to evade federal oversight is the reason that 
localities must ensure that law enforcement agencies remain 
accountable to the communities they serve. In this sense, the 
White House review succeeds. The memo suggests that the 
President “[r]equire local civilian (non-police) review of and 
authorization for LEAs to request or acquire controlled 
equipment.”71 Some states have already responded to botched 
raids and militarized tactics by enacting legislation aimed at 
gathering statistics on the issue.72 Such laws are promising, and 
certainly have merit, but policies must be implemented to limit 
SWAT raids to the originally intended scope of hostage and active 
shooter situations.  
V. Conclusion 
                                                                                                     
 68. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 62, at 6. 
 69. See Sells, supra note 33 (describing Missouri’s policy of SWAT team 
use). 
 70. See Kraska & Kappeler, supra note 15, at 9 (describing the means by 
which certain police forces are self funded). 
 71. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 62, at 6.  
 72. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-8.5 (2014) (requiring law enforcement 
agencies to report several statistics involving SWAT deployment); MD. 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CTR., supra note 24.  
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The citations presented in this Essay are a demonstration of 
the important first step that our country has taken in the 
demilitarization of police: awareness. The sources above 
represent all sides of the political, socioeconomic, and cultural 
spectrum, serving as a representation of the true import of the 
issue. However, it is critical that the American people take hold 
of this wave of public discourse to effect true change upon the 
destructive policies outlined herein. The people must strive to 
reintegrate police forces into the communities that they serve. 
The normalization of SWAT raids must stop, and officers’ faith in 
their own communities must be restored. No longer can we allow 
the overarching concept of “officer safety” to degrade justice and 
democracy. Rather, the paragon of a safe police officer is one that 
is protected by the community itself, not at war with it. Localities 
must pass their own laws and policies that demilitarize law 
enforcement agencies and allow communities to move forward 
with a proactive police force that restores the lost adage of “peace 
officer.” 
